Objectives: The official implementation of clinical pharmacy in Vietnam has arrived relatively late, resulting in various stressors. This study aims to evaluate job stress level and suggest viable solutions.Methods: A cross-sectional study was conducted on clinical pharmacists in 128 hospitals in Ho Chi Minh City. Job stress questions were derived from the Healthcare Profession Stress Inventory.Results: A total of 197 CPs participated, giving a response rate of 82.4%. Participants were found to have moderate job stress with an overall mean stress (...) score of 1.5 and stress rate of 52.8%. The sample size was statistically adequate and the HPSI was valid and reliable. Patient care responsibility was the main stressor, especially in public hospitals, followed by job conflicts. Lack of experience, low income, and inability to participate in clinical ward rounds caused significant stress to CPs regarding job recognition and job uncertainty. More practice-oriented training programs in bachelor curricula and clinical practice should be applied to help CPs gain more experience, self-confidence, and diminish job stress.Conclusion: CPs in HCMC have moderate stress. More practice-oriented training programs should be prioritized to lessen stress for CPs. (shrink)

Today, soft computing is a field that is used a lot in solving real-world problems, such as problems in economics, finance, banking... With the aim to serve for solving the real problem, many new theories and/or tools which were proposed, improved to help soft computing used more efficiently. We can mention some theories as fuzzy sets theory (L. Zadeh, 1965), intuitionistic fuzzy set (K Atanasov, 1986), neutrosophic set (F. Smarandache 1999). In this paper, we introduce a new notion of sup (...) port-neutrosophic set (SNS), which is the combination a neutrosophic set with a fuzzy set. So, SNS set is a direct extension of fuzzy set and neutrosophic sets (F. Smarandache). Then, we define some operators on the support-neutrosophic sets, and investigate some properties of these operators. (shrink)

This article aims at conceptualising the notion of embarrassment as a negativistic figure of thought that takes the experience of one’s own non-sovereignty as a starting point and emphasises an engagement with situations of not-knowing. This consideration is clarified in discussion with the figure of Socrates or with the philosophical attitude of Socrates. Because the negativistic thrust of the conceptualisation undertaken is reminiscent of irony, the paper then addresses the question of what distinguishes embarrassment understood as a figure of thought (...) from irony. For this purpose, Kierkegaard’s reading of Socratic irony is drawn upon. It is shown that irony is inherently a negativism, which in the last consequence aims at a retention of rights; but this is exactly what embarrassment avoids, because, as the article shows, it is not a negativism of strength, but of weakness. (shrink)

This article is a review and critical evaluation of the New Testament expressions that speak about the faith of Jesus beginning with the much discussed pistis Iesou Christou 'faith of/in Jesus Christ'. It is divided into three parts: (1) statistics of the New Testament expressions regarding the faith of Jesus, (2) historico-exegetical considerations of pistis Iesou Christou as 'faith of Jesus Christ' or 'faith in Jesus Christ', and (3) other key phrases that imply the faith of Christ. This leads to (...) the concluding reflections that underline, among other points, the importance and relevance of recalling the biblical meaning of the term pistis as faith and faithfulness, so as to break the impasse in the debate over the New Testament evidence regarding the faith of Jesus. Precisely in this biblico-theological perspective it is preferable to speak not so much about the faith that Jesus had, as about the fact that, in his radical self-emptying, he has lived our faith (as one of us), so that through our living in faith we can participate in his faith.(Italian). Copyright of Miscellanea Francescana is the property of Pontificia Facolta Teologica S. Bonaventura and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (shrink)

Computational drug repositioning has been proven as a promising and efficient strategy for discovering new uses from existing drugs. To achieve this goal, a number of computational methods have been proposed, which are based on different data sources of drugs and diseases. These methods approach the problem using either machine learning- or network-based models with an assumption that similar drugs can be used for similar diseases to identify new indications of drugs. Therefore, similarities between drugs and between diseases are usually (...) used as inputs. In addition, known drug-disease associations are also needed for the methods as prior information. It should be noted that those associations are still not well established due to the fact that many of marketed drugs have been withdrawn and this could affect the outcome of the methods. In this study, we propose a novel method named RLSDR to find new uses of drugs. More specifically, it relies on a semi-supervised learning model, Regularized Least Square, thus it does not require definition of non-drug-disease associations as previously proposed machine learning-based methods. In addition, the similarity between drugs measured by chemical structures of drug compounds and the similarity between diseases which share phenotypes can be represented in a form of either similarity network or similarity matrix as inputs of the method. Moreover, instead of using a gold-standard set of known drug-disease associations, we construct an artificial set of the associations based on known disease-gene and drug-target associations. Experiment results demonstrate that RLSDR achieves better prediction performance on the artificial set of drug-disease associations than that on the gold-standard ones in terms of area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve. In addition, it outperforms two representative network-based methods irrespective of the prior information of drug-disease associations. Novel indications for a number of drugs are also identified and validated by evidences from a different data resource. (shrink)

Geht es um die Frage, welche Faktoren zur Akzeptanz und Verbreitung von Verschwörungserzählungen beitragen, so verweist die Forschungsliteratur zur Erklärung oft auf sehr allgemeine Bedürfnisse, die in der Regel als anthropologische Gegebenheiten aufgefasst werden, wie etwa das Bedürfnis nach Sinngebung und Orientierung. Der vorliegende Artikel weist auf die möglichen Probleme einer anthropologischen Verkürzung der Sachlage bei solchen Erklärungsansätzen hin und formuliert einen genealogischen Ansatz, der es erlaubt, jene Bedürfnisse, die den Verschwörungsglauben begünstigen, als Resultat eines historisch voraussetzungsreichen Subjektivierungsprozesses zu begreifen. (...) Zur Beschreibung jenes Prozesses werden in Auseinandersetzung mit Nietzsches Genealogie der Moral insbesondere die Motive des Ressentiments und der Schuld als Triebkräfte herangezogen, die insbesondere unter säkularen Bedingungen Projektionsweisen befördern, auf denen Verschwörungserzählungen beruhen. (shrink)

Using a sample of US stocks over the period 1991–2019, we test whether stocks with high exposure to a social index exhibit high returns. Using a univariate analysis, our in‐sample results show that stocks with high sensitivities to the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index underperform stocks with low sensitivities by an annual risk‐adjusted performance of 7.02%. The negative premium is also larger in the post‐crisis period of 2007–2019 and is equal to 10.25%. The out‐of‐sample results offer, however, only weak evidence (...) of such a finding, with a risk‐adjusted performance difference of merely −0.84% over the full sample period and no significant differences between the pre‐crisis and post‐crisis periods. In the multivariate regression, we find evidence of a negative relationship between exposure to the social index and stock performance. Moreover, we find that stocks with high exposure to the social index display a low corporate social responsibility score, a high Tobin’s Q, high long‐term debt, a large size, high total risk, a high market beta, a high SMB coefficient, a low HML coefficient, and a small MOM coefficient. (shrink)

This paper introduces a novel method to control the operation of the active suspension system. In this research, a quarter-dynamic model is used to simulate the vehicle’s vibrations. Besides, the sliding mode-PID-integrated algorithm with five state variables is proposed to be used. This is a completely original and novel algorithm. The process of establishing the control algorithm is clearly described. The simulation is performed by the MATLAB software. The results of the paper have shown the advantages of the sliding mode-PID (...) algorithm used in this research. Accordingly, the displacement and acceleration of the sprung mass were significantly reduced when this algorithm was used. The maximum and average values of the displacement of the sprung mass are only 1.31% and 1.29%, respectively, compared with the situation of the vehicle using a passive suspension. Similarly, the value of the acceleration is 6.98% and 2.94%, respectively. In addition, the phenomenon of “chattering” has also been significantly reduced when using this controller. In the future, some more complex algorithms can be proposed. (shrink)

In this paper, a proposed modified stochastic fractal search algorithm is applied to find the most appropriate site and size of capacitor banks for distribution systems with 33, 69, and 85 buses. Two single-objective functions are considered to be reduction of power loss and reduction of total cost of energy loss and capacitor investment while satisfying limit of capacitors, limit of conductor, and power balance of the systems. MSFS was developed by performing three new mechanisms including new diffusion mechanism and (...) two new update mechanisms on the conventional stochastic fractal search algorithm. As a result, MSFS can reduce 0.002%, 0.003%, and 0.18% of the total power loss from SFS for the three study systems. As compared to other methods, MSFS can reduce power loss from 0.07% to 3.98% for the first system, from 3.7% to 7.3% for the second system, and from 0.92% to 6.98% for the third system. For the reduction of total cost, the improvement level of the proposed method over SFS and two other methods is more significant. It is 0.03%, 1.22%, and 5.76% for the second system and 2.31%, 0.87%, and 3.77% for the third system. It is emphasized that the proposed method can find the global optimal solutions for all study cases while SFS was still implementing search process nearby or far away from the solutions. Furthermore, MSFS can converge to the best solutions much faster than these compared methods. Consequently, it can be concluded that the proposed method is very effective for finding the best location and size of added capacitors in distribution power systems. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 31, Issue 3, Page 604-619, July 2022.

Recent significant changes in technology such as Artificial Intelligence and big data analysis have a wide impact in many areas of human societies, not least in education. Advances in efficien...

Nowadays, the power systems are getting more and more complicated because of the delays introduced by the communication networks. The existence of the delays usually leads to the degradation and/or instability of power system performance. On account of this point, the traditional load frequency control approach for power system sketches a destabilizing impact and an unacceptable system performance. Therefore, this paper proposes a new LFC based on adaptive integral second-order sliding mode control approach for the large-scale power system with communication (...) delays. First, a new linear matrix inequality is derived to ensure the stability of whole power systems using Lyapunov stability theory. Second, an AISOSMC law is designed to ensure the finite time reachability of the system states. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time the AISOSMC is designed for LFC of the LSPSwCD. In addition, the report of testing results presents that the suggested LFC based on AISOSMC can not only decrease effectively the frequency variation but also make successfully less in mount of power oscillation/fluctuation in tie-line exchange. (shrink)

Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...) our private reasoning and our public justification. There is, however, a price. In value capture, we take a central component of our autonomy — our ongoing deliberation over the exact articulation of our values — and we outsource it. And the metrics to which we outsource usually engineered for the interests of some external force, like a large-scale institution’s interest in cross-contextual comprehensibility and quick aggregability. That outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits to personal deliberation. In value capture, we no longer adjust our values and their articulations in light of own rich experience of the world. Our values should often be carefully tailored to our particular selves or our small-scale communities, but in value capture, we buy our values off the rack. In some cases – like decreasing CO2 emissions – the costs of non-tailored values are outweighed by the benefit of precise collective coordination. In other cases, like in our aesthetic lives, they are not. This suggests that we should want different values suited to different scales. We should want value federalism. Some values are perhaps best pursued at the largest-scale level, others at smaller scales. The problem occurs when we exhibit an excess preference for the largest-scale values – when we consistently let the universal metrics swamp our quieter interests. (shrink)

In her BBC Reith Lectures on Trust, Onora O’Neill offers a short, but biting, criticism of transparency. People think that trust and transparency go together but in reality, says O'Neill, they are deeply opposed. Transparency forces people to conceal their actual reasons for action and invent different ones for public consumption. Transparency forces deception. I work out the details of her argument and worsen her conclusion. I focus on public transparency – that is, transparency to the public over expert domains. (...) I offer two versions of the criticism. First, the epistemic intrusion argument: The drive to transparency forces experts to explain their reasoning to non-experts. But expert reasons are, by their nature, often inaccessible to non-experts. So the demand for transparency can pressure experts to act only in those ways for which they can offer public justification. Second, the intimate reasons argument: In many cases of practical deliberation, the relevant reasons are intimate to a community and not easily explicable to those who lack a particular shared background. The demand for transparency, then, pressures community members to abandon the special understanding and sensitivity that arises from their particular experiences. Transparency, it turns out, is a form of surveillance. By forcing reasoning into the explicit and public sphere, transparency roots out corruption — but it also inhibits the full application of expert skill, sensitivity, and subtle shared understandings. The difficulty here arises from the basic fact that human knowledge vastly outstrips any individual’s capacities. We all depend on experts, which makes us vulnerable to their biases and corruption. But if we try to wholly secure our trust — if we leash groups of experts to pursuing only the goals and taking only the actions that can be justified to the non-expert public — then we will undermine their expertise. We need both trust and transparency, but they are in essential tension. This is a deep practical dilemma; it admits of no neat resolution, but only painful compromise. (shrink)

Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...) bubbles cannot. Second, each type of structure requires a distinct intervention. Mere exposure to evidence can shatter an epistemic bubble, but may actually reinforce an echo chamber. Finally, echo chambers are much harder to escape. Once in their grip, an agent may act with epistemic virtue, but social context will pervert those actions. Escape from an echo chamber may require a radical rebooting of one's belief system. (shrink)

According to most accounts of trust, you can only trust other people (or groups of people). To trust is to think that another has goodwill, or something to that effect. I sketch a different form of trust: the unquestioning attitude. What it is to trust, in this sense, is to settle one’s mind about something, to stop questioning it. To trust is to rely on a resource while suspending deliberation over its reliability. Trust lowers the barrier of monitoring, challenging, checking, (...) and questioning. Trust sets up open pipelines between yourself and parts of the external world. Trust permits external resources to have a similar relationship to one as one’s internal cognitive faculties. This creates efficiency, but at the price of exquisite vulnerability. We must trust in this way because we are cognitively limited beings in a cognitively overwhelming world. Crucially, we can hold the unquestioning attitude towards objects and technologies. When I trust my climbing rope, I stop worrying about its reliability. When I trust my online calendaring system, I simply go to the events indicated, without question. But, one might worry, how could one ever hold such a normatively loaded attitude as trust towards mere objects? How could it ever make sense to feel betrayed by an object? Trust is our engine for expanding and outsourcing our agency — for binding external processes into our practical selves. Thus, we can be betrayed by our smartphones in the same way that we can be betrayed by our memory. When we trust, we try to make something a part of our agency, and we are betrayed when our part lets us down. To unquestioningly trust something is to let it in—to attempt to bring it inside one’s practical functioning. This suggests a new form of gullibility: agential gullibility, which occurs when agents too hastily and carelessly integrate external resources into their own agency. (shrink)

Games may seem like a waste of time, where we struggle under artificial rules for arbitrary goals. The author suggests that the rules and goals of games are not arbitrary at all. They are a way of specifying particular modes of agency. This is what make games a distinctive art form. Game designers designate goals and abilities for the player; they shape the agential skeleton which the player will inhabit during the game. Game designers work in the medium of agency. (...) Game-playing, then, illuminates a distinctive human capacity. We can take on ends temporarily for the sake of the experience of pursuing them. Game play shows that our agency is significantly more modular and more fluid than we might have thought. It also demonstrates our capacity to take on an inverted motivational structure. Sometimes we can take on an end for the sake of the activity of pursuing that end. (shrink)

Twitter makes conversation into something like a game. It scores our communication, giving us vivid and quantified feedback, via Likes, Retweets, and Follower counts. But this gamification doesn’t just increase our motivation to communicate; it changes the very nature of the activity. Games are more satisfying than ordinary life precisely because game-goals are simpler, cleaner, and easier to apply. Twitter is thrilling precisely because its goals have been artificially clarified and narrowed. When we buy into Twitter’s gamification, then our values (...) shift from the complex and pluralistic values of communication, to the narrower quest for popularity and virality. Twitter’s gamification bears some resemblance with the phenomena of echo chambers and moral outrage porn. In all these phenomena, we are instrumentalizing our ends for hedonistic reasons. We have shifted our aims in an activity, not because the new aims are more valuable, but in exchange for extra pleasure. (shrink)

There seems to be a deep tension between two aspects of aesthetic appreciation. On the one hand, we care about getting things right. On the other hand, we demand autonomy. We want appreciators to arrive at their aesthetic judgments through their own cognitive efforts, rather than deferring to experts. These two demands seem to be in tension; after all, if we want to get the right judgments, we should defer to the judgments of experts. The best explanation, I suggest, is (...) that aesthetic appreciation is something like a game. When we play a game, we try to win. But often, winning isn’t the point; playing is. Aesthetic appreciation involves the same flipped motivational structure: we aim at the goal of correctness, but having correct judgments isn’t the point. The point is the engaged process of interpreting, investigating, and exploring the aesthetic object. Deferring to aesthetic testimony, then, makes the same mistake as looking up the answer to a puzzle, rather than solving it for oneself. The shortcut defeats the whole point. This suggests a new account of aesthetic value: the engagement account. The primary value of the activity of aesthetic appreciation lies in the process of trying to generate correct judgments, and not in having correct judgments. -/- *There is an audio version available: look for the Soundcloud link, below.*. (shrink)

The feeling of clarity can be dangerously seductive. It is the feeling associated with understanding things. And we use that feeling, in the rough-and-tumble of daily life, as a signal that we have investigated a matter sufficiently. The sense of clarity functions as a thought-terminating heuristic. In that case, our use of clarity creates significant cognitive vulnerability, which hostile forces can try to exploit. If an epistemic manipulator can imbue a belief system with an exaggerated sense of clarity, then they (...) can induce us to terminate our inquiries too early — before we spot the flaws in the system. How might the sense of clarity be faked? Let’s first consider the object of imitation: genuine understanding. Genuine understanding grants cognitive facility. When we understand something, we categorize its aspects more easily; we see more connections between its disparate elements; we can generate new explanations; and we can communicate our understanding. In order to encourage us to accept a system of thought, then, an epistemic manipulator will want the system to provide its users with an exaggerated sensation of cognitive facility. The system should provide its users with the feeling that they can easily and powerfully create categorizations, generate explanations, and communicate their understanding. And manipulators have a significant advantage in imbuing their systems with a pleasurable sense of clarity, since they are freed from the burdens of accuracy and reliability. I offer two case studies of seductively clear systems: conspiracy theories; and the standardized, quantified value systems of bureaucracies. (shrink)

I propose to study one problem for epistemic dependence on experts: how to locate experts on what I will call cognitive islands. Cognitive islands are those domains for knowledge in which expertise is required to evaluate other experts. They exist under two conditions: first, that there is no test for expertise available to the inexpert; and second, that the domain is not linked to another domain with such a test. Cognitive islands are the places where we have the fewest resources (...) for evaluating experts, which makes our expert dependences particularly risky. -/- Some have argued that cognitive islands lead to the complete unusability of expert testimony: that anybody who needs expert advice on a cognitive island will be entirely unable to find it. I argue against this radical form of pessimism, but propose a more moderate alternative. I demonstrate that we have some resources for finding experts on cognitive islands, but that cognitive islands leave us vulnerable to an epistemic trap which I will call runaway echo chambers. In a runaway echo chamber, our inexpertise may lead us to pick out bad experts, which will simply reinforce our mistaken beliefs and sensibilities. (shrink)

Games have a complex, and seemingly paradoxical structure: they are both competitive and cooperative, and the competitive element is required for the cooperative element to work out. They are mechanisms for transforming competition into cooperation. Several contemporary philosophers of sport have located the primary mechanism of conversion in the mental attitudes of the players. I argue that these views cannot capture the phenomenological complexity of game-play, nor the difficulty and moral complexity of achieving cooperation through game-play. In this paper, I (...) present a different account of the relationship between competition and cooperation. My view is a distributed view of the conversion: success depends on a large number of features. First, the players must achieve the right motivational state: playing for the sake of the struggle, rather than to win. Second, successful transformation depends on a large number of extra-mental features, including good game design, and social and institutional features. (shrink)

The current debate over aesthetic testimony typically focuses on cases of doxastic repetition — where, when an agent, on receiving aesthetic testimony that p, acquires the belief that p without qualification. I suggest that we broaden the set of cases under consideration. I consider a number of cases of action from testimony, including reconsidering a disliked album based on testimony, and choosing an artistic educational institution from testimony. But this cannot simply be explained by supposing that testimony is usable for (...) action, but unusable for doxastic repetition. I consider a new asymmetry in the usability aesthetic testimony. Consider the following cases: we seem unwilling to accept somebody hanging a painting in their bedroom based merely on testimony, but entirely willing to accept hanging a painting in a museum based merely on testimony. The switch in intuitive acceptability seems to track, in some complicated way, the line between public life and private life. These new cases weigh against a number of standing theories of aesthetic testimony. I suggest that we look further afield, and that something like a sensibility theory, in the style of John McDowell and David Wiggins, will prove to be the best fit for our intuitions for the usability of aesthetic testimony. I propose the following explanation for the new asymmetry: we are willing to accept testimony about whether a work merits being found beautiful; but we are unwilling to accept testimony about whether something actually is beautiful. (shrink)

Art can be addressed, not just to individuals, but to groups. Art can even be part of how groups think to themselves – how they keep a grip on their values over time. I focus on monuments as a case study. Monuments, I claim, can function as a commitment to a group value, for the sake of long-term action guidance. Art can function here where charters and mission statements cannot, precisely because of art’s powers to capture subtlety and emotion. In (...) particular, art can serve as the vessel for group emotions, by making emotional content sufficiently public so as to be the object of a group commitment. Art enables groups to guide themselves with values too subtle to be codified. (shrink)

On April 19, 2024, the New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness was announced at the “Emerging Science of Animal Consciousness” conference held at New York University. The New York Declaration is an effort to showcase a scientific consensus on the presence of conscious experiences across all vertebrates (including reptiles, amphibians, and fish) and many invertebrates (at least including cephalopods, decapod crustaceans, and insects). Scientifically, the New York Declaration marks a significant advancement for humanity. However, it also brings heightened awareness to (...) the moral challenges associated with animals that have conscious experiences (or phenomenal consciousness). This article will discuss philosophical approaches to the moral issue of killing sentient beings, thereby highlighting an existing moral dilemma in human society: In sustaining human survival, a species considered to have morality, we have to violate our own moral standards by killing other species with intrinsic value, consciousness, or sentience. This moral dilemma has long been present in human society. Various solutions have been proposed and implemented in practice to address this issue, such as the non-violence and vegetarian approach of Buddhism, the application of Islamic law and sacred rituals to animals in Islam, animal rights movements and voluntary extinction in Western countries, and the technology producing meat using animal cells. However, despite these approaches, we have not yet been able to fully resolve the dilemma, as sentient beings continue to be killed for our survival. We believe the most feasible solution is to change the current food consumption culture, build an eco-surplus culture to mitigate climate change, prevent deforestation, and promote peace. (shrink)

Bare plural generic sentences pervade ordinary talk. And yet it is extremely controversial what semantics to assign to such sentences. In this paper, I achieve two tasks. First, I develop a novel classification of the various standard uses to which bare plurals may be put. This “variety data” is important—it gives rise to much of the difficulty in systematically theorizing about bare plurals. Second, I develop a novel account of bare plurals, the radical account. On this account, all bare plurals (...) fail to express propositions. The content of a bare plural has to be pragmatically “completed” by a speaker in order for her to make an assertion. At least the content of a quantifier expression has to be supplied. But sometimes, the content of a sentential operator or modal verb is also supplied. The radical account straightforwardly explains the variety data: Speakers’ communicative intentions vary wildly across different contexts. (shrink)